

# The True History of Khmer Krom

---

**[5] Khmer Krom were naively conned to serve Vietminh  
and Vietcong**

SLK  
10/01/2009

“Did Vietnamese crocodile leaders always help us the Khmer Victims from the bottom of their heart?” Undoubtedly, we asked ourselves, “The answer; no way! Because our lands are being ceaselessly plundered, robbed, swallowed up, eaten little by little, conquered and encroached so far so worse.”

## **[5] Khmer Krom were naively conned to serve Vietminh and Vietcong**

VIETMINH and Vietcong who were the same worst criminals of the 20 Century had created so many unbearable horrible killing fields in both Cambodia and Khmer Krom so far so worse, in which no other race on this earth can do like Yuon can and they are able to seal off their one million Super-Dirty-Wicked Plans so far so good tactfully. No foreign writers/journalist can write a good history of Cambodia who wrote in their book like riding a horse/cow in a stable without going anywhere except only inside of it.

“Did Vietnamese crocodile leaders always help us the Khmer Victims from the bottom of their heart?” Undoubtedly, we asked ourselves, “The answer; no way! Because our lands are being ceaselessly plundered, robbed, swallowed up, eaten little by little, conquered and encroached so far so worse.”

One possible explanation is that the people in the outside world did not truly understand the nature of the Vietminh and Vietcong until the massive exodus of refugees in the wake of the Vietnamese Wondrous victory 30 April 1975 made it impossible to ignore. As we clearly see Yuon crocodile leaders thank Americans million times that they helped to search and destroy nearly both Khmer Kandal and Khmer Krom people lives, temple/wats and properties...etc:

“During the Vietnam War, the American people supported Vietnam,” he recalled. “I thank the American people for that.” While Vietnam won great victories against French and U.S. imperialism, they came at tremendous cost. In the war against the U.S., Vietnam lost between 3 and 4 million people, compared to 55,000 for the U.S. side.

But the Vietnamese people triumphed because they were led by a communist party with deep roots in the people, had a battle-tested and seasoned leadership with a deep understanding of the political forces in play, and possessed an unshakable desire for national sovereignty and independence. (Vietnamese hero compares Iraq with Vietnam By G. Dunkel.<sup>1</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> This was posted in the Politic Forum by Posted: Big Belly Boy Date: Monday, 30 May 2005, at 1:53 p.m

## Vietnam remembers and reflects

2005.04.28



US helicopters airlift members of the 2nd Battalion, 14<sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiment during operation 'Wahiawa' a search and destroy mission, northeast of Cu Chi, Vietnam on 16 May, 1966. AFP Photo/National Archives.

Politics Forum

### Ho Chi Minh had great military strategy

Date: Sunday, 29 May 2005, at 2:33 p.m.

People in here probably do not know who Viet Cong are. They probably think that North Vietnamese were Vietcong. Vietcong were the recruited militia from the South Vietnam to fight for the North Vietnamese. Teetuy <sup>2</sup>

### Note on Designations<sup>3</sup>

Since much of this is based on MACV intelligence, the way that they classified units is worth quoting. North Vietnamese Army (NVA) Units: A unit formed, trained and designated by North Vietnam as an NVA unit and composed completely or primarily of North Vietnamese. Viet Cong (VC) Units: A unit formed and trained in South Vietnam whose original personnel composition consisted primarily of people residing in South Vietnam.

Main Force (MF) Units: Those VC or NVA military units which are directly subordinate to Central Office South Vietnam (COSVN), a Viet Cong military region, military sub-region, or front. Local Force (LF) Units: Those VC or NVA military units which are directly subordinate to province and district party committees and normally operate within the territorial jurisdiction of their respective control headquarters.

<sup>2</sup> <http://camweb.org/bbs/politics/index.cgi?read=60478>

<sup>3</sup> Submitted by Richard A. Rinaldi © 1999

Guerrillas were noted as being separate from all of the units listed in the enemy order of battle, usually organized into platoons and squads and directly subordinate to the party apparatus at village and hamlet levels.

### **Command 1965-1972**

Formally the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) and People's Liberation Armed Force (PLAF), these two are known to Americans as the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Viet Cong (VC). The NVA had four Military Regions (1-4) in North Vietnam, and established numbers for regions in South Vietnam. The VC had a separate numbering system.

Military Region 5 covered the northern half of South Vietnam (the ARVN I CTZ and II CTZ south to Dar Lac and Khanh Hoa provinces). It organized the 1st, 2nd and 3rd VC Regiments; the 1st was engaged against the Marines in Quang Ngai Province in Aug 1965 during Operation Starlite. In fall 1965 it reorganized its forces into 2nd and 3rd Divisions and 10th Regiment. MR 5 was roughly the same for the NVA and VC. The lowlands from Da Nang to Nha Trang was the B-1 Front or B-1 Theatre.

Tay Nguyen Front was subordinate to MR 5, and established Sep 1964. It covered the central highlands parallel to the Ho Chi Minh trail. This is also shown as the B-3 Front or B-3 Theater. (It also roughly corresponded to part of the VC's MR 10 and part of MR 1.)

Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region was carved out in Apr 1966 (Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces). It was in control of the B-4 Front and the B-5 Front (established Jun 1966; the latter along Route 9 and the former the rest of the area). By the end of 1966 the region as such stopped trying to control the two fronts, which remained separate until Mar 1972. (B-5 front then operated under the control of Military Region 4, the southernmost region in North Vietnam.) The B-4 and B-5 Fronts were combined in Nov 1972. 70 [or 70B?] Corps was established Oct 1970 to coordinate Divisions 304, 308, 320 and other units along Route 9 and in Laos. It was still active in Mar 1972, in the Quang Tri area.

Southern Regional Headquarters controlled Military Regions 6 to 9 and the Saigon-Gia Dinh Special Zone. These were known collectively as the B-2 Theatre. These were known collectively as the B-2 Theater.

Military Region 6 covered the rest of ARVN's II CTZ and the very northern part of III CTZ (Quang Duc, Tuyen Duc, Ninh Thuan, Binh Thuan, Lam Dong, and Binh Tuy provinces). (The westernmost elements of this and MR 7 fell into the VC's MR 10.)

Military Region 7 (or Eastern Nam Bo Region) covered the ARVN's III CTZ, roughly from Saigon to the north (Phuoc Long, Long Khanh, Phuoc Tuy, Binh Long, Binhy Dong, Bien Hoa, Tay Ninh, and Hau Nghia provinces). In Oct 1967 this region took over the Saigon-Gia Dinh Special Zone. (This was roughly the VC's MR's 1 and 4.)

Military Region 8 was southwest of Saigon, running from Cambodia to the South China Sea (Long An, Kien Tuong, Sa Dec, Dinh Tuong, Go Cong and Kien Hoa provinces). (This was largely the VC's MR 2.)

Military Region 9 covered the southernmost part of South Vietnam (Ghau Doc, An Giang, Vinh Long, Vinh Binh, Phong Dinh, Ba Xuyen, Kien Giang, Bac Lieu and An Xuyen provinces). (This was largely the VC's MR 3.)

### **Divisions activated in the South**

At the beginning of 1965, the Viet Cong had 47 Main Force battalions, including those in five regiments (note 1). Expansion (including NVA regiments) allowed the activation of divisions beginning in Sep 1965. A complete list of known VC regiments and battalions for the period through late 1971 is Attachment A. A summary of NVA and VC strength (in battalions) for the period Dec 1966 to Jan 1972 is Attachment D.

Division 3 activated 2 Sep 1965 with Regiments 2, 12 and 22. The 2nd was one of the original VC regiments, the 12th had been Regiment 18 of NVA Division 312 (entering the south Feb 1965), and the 22nd was formed of northern and local troops. The division also had mortar, AA, and engineer battalions on formation. The division was largely dispersed after Tet 1968 until reassembled in Jun 1971, with Regiment 21 replacing the 22nd. In Jun 1973 NVA Regiment 141 replaced the 21st.

Division 9 activated 2 Sep 1965, the first all-VC division organized in the South (probably 271 and 272 Regiments and one regiment was newly-formed for the activation of the division [note 2]). It was reorganized over time, gaining Regiment 3B (the old Regiment 88 of NVA Division 308); that regiment was replaced 1969 by Regiment 95C [of NVA Division 325C], which took the designation at some point as 3rd. In Mar 1972 the division had VC Regiments 271 and 272, NVA Regiment 95C, 22nd VC Artillery, 24th VC Air Defence and T28 VC Recon Battalions (all in Tay Ninh except Binh Long for the air defence battalion).

Division 2 activated 20 Oct 1965 in Quang Nam province, around 1st VC and NVA 21st Regiments and Battalion 70. The 1st was one of the original VC regiments from around 1962, and the 21st was a newly-arrived northern unit. NVA Regiment 31 joined in 1966. The division retreated to Laos in 1970, where it fought until Mar 1971, receiving NVA Regiment 141 in place of 21. The Mar 1972 list showed it with HQ in Quang Tin, VC Regiment 1 Quang Tin, NVA Regiments 21 (Quang Ngai) and 31 (Quang Tin), along with 10 NVA Sapper Bn, 12 NVA Art Bn and GK40 NVA Engr Bn (all Quang Tin). In spring 1972 it was back in the Tay Nguyn area and received Regiment 52 (from Division 320). A reorganization mid 1973 gave the division Regiments 31, 38 and 141; in late 1974 it gained also NVA Regiment 36 and Artillery Regiment 368.

Division 1 formed 10 Dec 1965 with Regiments 33, 66, and 320 (all of which had entered SVN earlier, and served in the Central Highlands under Division 325). Regiment 33 later left as a separate unit, and the division was joined by Regiment 88, which itself left in late 1967. It may have been reorganized before Dec 1972.

Division 5 activated 23 Nov 1965 in Ba Ria base area with Regiments 4 and 5. This unit operated at regiment strength until perhaps 1971. In Mar 1972 HQ was at Phuoc Long, with VC Regiment 275; NVA Regiment 174 was in Tay Ninh and VC Regiment 6 in Binh Long. Other division elements were 22 NVA Artillery Bn, 24 NVA Air Defence Bn, 27 VC Recon Bn and 28 VC Sapper Bn (all Binh Long)..

Division 7 activated 13 Jun 1966 in the Phuoc Lon area, with Regiments 16 [formerly NVA Regiment 101 of Division 325], NVA Regiments 141 and 165 (formerly of Division 312). The 16th was soon replaced by Regiment 52 [of NVA Division 320]. In Mar 1972 the division had NVA 141, 165 and 209 Regiments, along with K22 Artillery, 24 Air Defence, 28 Engineer, and 95 Recon Sapper Bns (all in Tay Ninh).

Division 10 activated 20 Sep 1972 in the Tay Nguyen Front, with Regiments 28, 66 and 95B. Regiment 24 was incorporated spring 1973 and Regiment 95B transferred to Division 320 in spring 1975.

Division 711 organized 29 Jun 1971 in Binh Dinh province. Dissolved in late 1973, with personnel going to form Brigade 52.

### **69<sup>th</sup> Artillery division**

This is shown as 69 VC Artillery Division in III CTZ with an established/operational date of Aug 1962 for the division and its HQ and support units. This date is not believable. In Mar 1972 the division controlled 96 NVA Artillery Regiment (which included one VC battalion, also with the Aug 1962 established date) and 208B BVA Rocket Regiment. Both regiments are shown as entering III CTZ in 1971. The division also had a VC air defence bn (established 1964) and VC mortar bn (established Nov 1965). Various units were in Tay Ninh and Binh Long.

### **North Vietnamese divisions**

Division 325 began moving south Nov 1964 (Regiments 33, 95 and 101). It served in the Central Highlands with Regiments 95, 101 and 320 (Regiment 18 had gone to Tay Nguyen Front). The division was dissolved by late 1965, with elements going to VC Division 1 or becoming separate regiments.

Division 304 (Regiments 9, 24, 66) sent south Aug 1965; Regiment 9 initially served in Laos and Regiment 66 with Division 1 in Dec 1965. Returned north Jun 1968, but served in Laos spring 1971 and in northern South Vietnam from 1971.

Division 308 initially contributed one of three battalions, which became Regiment 320 ca. 1964. Its Regiment 88 infiltrated south in 1966 and the rest of the division Sep 1967 (Regiments 36, 88, 102).

Division 312 sent a battalion south in spring 1963 and another in 1964. Its Regiments 141 and 165 went to the B2 front in 1966, to serve as the nucleus of VC Division 7. The division went south in Sep 1967 and was regrouped after Tet back in North Vietnam, with Regiments 141, 165, and 209. It served in Laos 1969 ? 71. Its regiments served with other divisions 1972, then were withdrawn back north. In spring 1975 the division was sent south again.

Division 316 (Regiments 98, 174 and 176) sent Regiment 174 to the Tay Nguyen highlands in 1967, but mostly operated in Laos. It participated in the central highlands (Ban Me Thuot) spring 1975.

Division 320 sent a mortar battalion to the south in Aug 1965, then Regiment 64 in Feb 1966 and Regiment 52 later that year. The entire division was in South Vietnam Sep 1967, but withdrew to the North in Oct 1968. (However, shown by Marines as still in I CTZ Jan 1969, with Regiments 48, 52 and 64.) It came south again in Oct 1970, serving in Laos in 1971. It went North yet again, but appeared in Tay Nguyen Front Jan 1972.

Division 320B (which included Regiments 48B and 64B) served in the 1972 Easter offensive and withdrew to the north Sep 1973.

Division 325B came south in spring 1966 (included Regiments 95B, 101B). Regiment 101B combined with Regiment 101C. Later operated with Regiments 24, 33, and 95B, which also served as independent regiments. The division was dissolved ca. late 1966.

Division 324 was formed Jun 1965 and moved south in late 1966 (included Regiment 3).

Division 325C (Regiments 18C, 95C, and 101D) began moving south late 1966. Following Tet, the regiments stayed behind and the division headquarters went north to form Division 325D.

Division 304B moved south of the DMZ early 1968 (Regiments 9B, 24B, 66B?); no other known service. In Mar 1972 it had Regiments 9, 24B, and 66B and 20 Sapper Bn (all in Quang Tri).

Division 325D (included Regiments 18D and 95D) was formed ca. 1967 and essentially a training and reserve unit, even though Regiment 18D went to Laos and Regiment 95D to Route 9 in early 1969. The division played a major role in the 1972 Easter Offensive, at which time it dropped the "D" and became Division 325.

Division 324B is shown in I CTZ in Mar 1972. At that time it had HQ and Regiment 812 in Quang Tri, with Regiments 29 and 803 in Thua Thien.

## North Vietnamese army and Viet Cong, January 1968

In Jan 1968, month of the Tet offensive, the number of confirmed battalions was shown by MACV as:

- I CTZ: 16 VC and 53 NVA maneuver battalions
- II CTZ: 15 VC and 35 NVA maneuver battalions
- III CT: 39 VC and 20 NVA maneuver battalions
- IV CTZ: 29 VC maneuver battalions

Somewhat earlier, in Mar 1967, sapper units had included Brigade 305, Regiment 426, and nine battalions under control of the Sapper Branch (note 3), and there may have been other sapper units under B-2 Front.

By Jan 1969 68B and 368B Rocket Regiments were in I CTZ.

NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY and VIETCONG ca. March 1972

A complete list of identified units is included as Attachment B

NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY and VIETCONG December 1972 (note 4)

- 1st NVA Inf Div
- 52nd, 101DNVA; 44th Sapper NVA
- 2nd NVA Inf Div
- 1st, 141st NVA; 52nd VC
- 3rd NVA Inf Div
- 2nd, 12th, 21st NVA
- 5th VC Div
- E-6, 174th, 205th, 275th NVA
- 7th VC Inf Div
- 141st, 165th, 209th NVA
- 9th VC Div
- 95C, 271st, 272nd NVA
- 304th NVA Inf Div
- 9th, 24B, 66th NVA
- 308th NVA Inf Div
- 36th, 88th, 102nd NVA
- 312th NVA Inf Div
- 141st, 165th, 209th NVA (note 5)
- 320th NVA Inf Div
- 48th, 64th NVA
- 320B NVA Inf Div
- 48B, 64B NVA
- 324B NVA Inf Div
- 29th, 803rd, 812th NVA (note 6)



- 325C NVA Inf Div
- 18C, 95C, 101D NVA
- 711th NVA Inf Div
- 3rd, 38th, 270th NVA
- B-3 Front ( Central Highlands) (note 7)
- 28th, 66th, 95B NVA; 40th NVA Art
- B-5 Front ( DMZ)
- 27B, 31st, 246th, 270B NVA; 38th, 84th NVA Art
- MR 3 ( Delta)
- D-1, D-2, D-3 VC, 18B, 95th NVA
- MR 2
- DT-1 VC, 86th NVA
- MR 7
- 33rd NVA; 274th VC; 74th NVA Art (?)
- MR Tri-Thien-Hue
- 4th?, 5th, 6th NVA
- Independent
- 24th, 101st, 271st NVA

A South Vietnamese source shows the following units available in Jan 1973, grouped by ARVN CTZ.

- I CTZ: 7 infantry and 1 AA divisions; 6 infantry, 3 sapper, 6 artillery, 2 armor, and 12 AA separate regiments
- II CTZ: 3 infantry divisions; 5 infantry, 1 sapper, 2 artillery and 1 armor separate regiments
- III CTZ: 2 infantry, 1 sapper and 1 artillery divisions; 8 infantry, 2 sapper, 2 artillery and 1 armor regiments
- IV CTZ: 2 infantry divisions and 11 separate infantry regiments

Units identified included M26 Armor Brigade, 75th Artillery Division, 377th AA Division, 5th Engineer Division and 27th Sapper Division.

Artillery was estimated at 430 122mm and 130mm guns. Armored vehicles of all types were estimated at 655 (including APC's and artillery tractors; this total also includes items such as the 152mm D20 gun-howitzer and 10mm T12 anti-tank gun).

The source indicates that the NVA introduced "20 more" AA regiments following the cease-fire. Sapper units under direct control of B-2 Front (Southern Regional Headquarters) prior to the 1975 spring offensive included 12 regiments or equivalents and 36 battalions. These were apparently in addition to any units under control of the Sapper Branch.

## **Tank brigades**

Tank Brigade 202 first saw action 1971 in Laos (Battalion 397). It participated in the Easter Offensive 1972 and the spring 1975 final offensive.

Tank Brigade 203 also saw action in Laos early 1971 (Battalions 198 and 297) and served in the 1975 spring offensive.

## **CORPS used in the final phase of the war**

2<sup>nd</sup> Military Corps established 17 May 1974 in Tri Thien Front (Divisions 304, 324, 325; AA Division 367; Tank Brigade 203; Artillery Brigade 164, Engineer Brigade 219). Following the collapse of the ARVN in I CTZ in 1975 it pushed elements down the coast.

4<sup>th</sup> Military Corps established 20 Jul 1974 (Divisions 5, 7, 9; Artillery Regiment 24; AA Regiment 71; Engineer Regiment 25; Sapper Regiment 429). This led the attack on Saigon from the northwest; shifting Division 5 and gaining Division 341. This corps grew out of Group 301, established 18 Mar 1971 (Divisions 5, 7 and 9 and Artillery Regiment 28) to control forces operating against the ARVN invasion of Cambodia that year..

3<sup>rd</sup> Military Corps established 26 Mar 1975 utilizing the command staff of the Tay Nguyen Front (Divisions 10, 316, 320; Artillery Regiments 40 and 675; AA Regiments 234 and 593; Tank Regiment 273; Engineer Regiment 7). It controlled the push on Saigon through eastern South Vietnam in the final offensive.

1<sup>st</sup> Military Corps established in the north 24 Oct 1973 (Divisions 308, 312, 320B; AA Division 367; Artillery Brigade 45; Tank Brigade 202; Engineer Brigade 299), and moved to the south late Mar 1975 for the final push on Saigon.

## **Divisions first appearing 1973-1975**

Division 4 formed (possibly 1973 or 1974) from previously separate Regiments D1, 18B and 95A, it first served in the 1975 spring offensive.

Division 6 formed (possibly 1973 or 1974) from previously separate Regiments 24, DT1, and 207, it first served in the 1975 spring offensive.

Division 8 formed (possibly 1973 or 1974) from previously separate Regiments Z15 and Z18, it first served in the 1975 spring offensive.

Division 303 activated 19 Aug 1974 (briefly designated Division 3), with VC Regiments 201, 205 and 271 and NVA Artillery Regiment 262.

Division 341 was reformed 1972 and sent south in Jan 1975.

## Air defense and air force

Air Force Regiment 921 was organized Aug 1964 and Air Force Regiment 923 a year later. In 1964 there was essentially no North Vietnamese air force, and the first MiG-15 and ?17 fighters appearing in Aug 1964 probably came from Communist China. By mid-Jun 1965 there were around 70 MiG-15 and ?17 fighters, with the first MiG-21?s arriving in late Dec 1965. There were also 8 Il-28 jet bombers. This strength stayed stable, with fighter strength at the end of 1966 still at 70 (15 MiG-21) (note 🤔). In 1967, the North Vietnamese lost 75 fighters in air-to-air combat and another 15 on the ground. While these were replaced, it appears that all but about 20 fighters were withdrawn to China for retraining and regrouping. Air Force Division 371 was formed 24 Mar 1967 with Air Force Regiments 921 and 923. Fighter strength in-country remained at around 25 in the beginning months of 1968. The 8 IL-28 bombers were organized into an operational unit as late as Oct 1968.

Two further regiments were formed: Air Force Regiment 925 was formed Feb 1969 and Air Force Regiment 927 in Feb 1972. These may have come under Air Force Division 371. The air defense force, with 6 AA and 2 radar regiments in 1963, grew rapidly from 1965 onwards. In 1964 there were about 700 AA weapons of all types and 20 early warning radar sets. Air defense was limited to key population or military sites and effective at heights of 20,000 feet or lower. The first SAM sites were under construction from Apr 1965, with the first known operational use in Jul 1965. These began in the Hanoi area, extending by the end of the year to Haiphong, the LOC area south of Thanh Hoa, and elsewhere. More than 60 sites were known by the end of the year. There was also a major expansion in AA gun and radar strength and capability (2100 AA weapons by Feb 1965, for example).

The air defense force was organized into divisions by Jun 1966.

- AA Division 361 formed 19 May 1965 for defense of Hanoi
- AA Division 363 formed Jun 1966 for defense of Haiphong
- AA Division 365 established Jun 1966
- AA Division 367 was a mobile unit established Jun 1966, and sent to MR 4 (initially with 4 AA gun and one AA missile regiments)
- AA Division 369 was established Jun 1966

By the end of 1966, there were about 150 SAM sites in North Vietnam. Radar sites had grown to over 100, a mixture of early warning, ground-control intercept, AA fire control, and SAM-associated. Another 100 sites were discovered by the end of 1967, and the force organized into 25 SAM battalions.

Two further divisions were formed:

- AA Division 368 was established by 1968 in MR 4

- AA Division 377 was formed in MR 4 in 1968 with three regiments taken from other sites

By Apr 1968, the North Vietnamese had 8000 AA weapons (the majority light AA or automatic weapons, but including 100mm AA guns) (note 9). There were more than 350 radars and almost 300 SAM sites.

## Notes

1. These numbers may or may not include such NVA units as Regiment 320, which had come south in 1964. Other NVA regiments were en route by early 1965.
2. Regiments 271 and 272 might have originally been numbered as 1st and 2nd (duplicating numbers used further north in Division 5). The third regiment may have been numbered as 3rd, which would also be a duplicate number.
3. Known as Sapper Command in the MACV listing.
4. This list is largely from Stanton, who notes that numbers were often duplicated (e.g., Regiment 101, 101B, 101C, etc.) but does not always indicate variations. His allocation of units to NVA and VC is not always consistent with Webster's, which provides the only real listing of divisions I have ever seen in English. The Military Regions appear to be the VC rather than NVA numbers.
5. While listed in Stanton, Webster's indicates that its regiments were actually operating with other divisions in 1972 and did not rejoin it until all withdrawn to the north in 1973.
6. This division is not included in the comprehensive listing in Webster's, so no service details are known.
7. The three infantry regiments shown here had become part of Division 10 on 20 Sep 1972.
8. However, 29 aircraft had been lost in combat with the Americans, so replacements were sufficient to offset losses.
9. The first of the 100mm AA guns were introduced in Jul 1965

## Order of Battle (1965-1975)

Physically, it did not run practically any danger. In this summer 1953, the war of Indo-China was blown, at least in the South. The French were ready to grant independence to the non-communist components of their federation, while continuing the engagements against the Communists, in particular in North-Vietnam. In November 1953, yielding to the authorities of Sihanouk, France signed an agreement devoting the independence of Kampuchea, within the framework of the French Union. That made it possible Sihanouk to proclaim that its "royal crusade", launched the previous year, had been crowned success. A little later the engagements ceased between the French forces and Khmer resistance. During following months, many non-communist groups of resistance were joined the government of Sihanouk. Those which were controlled by the Vietnamese awaited the continuation of the events.<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup> [http://amekhmer.free.fr/Site\\_Fr/geno\\_fr.htm](http://amekhmer.free.fr/Site_Fr/geno_fr.htm) (Then; Brother One)

Here are the other four Yuon Dracula-crocodile leaders, who had brought great unmentionable destructions, miseries, tragedies, painful memories and oppressions...etc., are the worst violators of human rights on earth against all the peoples in Khmer Krom/Khmer Kandal, Laos/Hmongs and Montangards/Yuons. Especially, it's really a bad Karma haunted President Diem, who had brutally committed crimes against Khmer Krom Buddhist monks during his Terror Regime, was killed on the order of President Kennedy:

The U.S. Regime initially supported President Diem but six years later supported a coup d'etat by ARVN Military Junta (Mai Huu Xuan and other Generals) who ordered the murder of President Diem, his brother Nhu, Colonel Le Quang Tung, Colonel Ho Tan Quyen, LTC Le Quang Trieu and other Special Forces Staff.

To cover up the blunder, US press reported that President Diem was corrupted. When he was assassinated, he owned only one very small and simple home. The death of President Diem was a political embarrassment for President Kennedy. Less than three weeks after President Ngo Dinh Diem was assassinated, President John F. Kennedy was likewise killed by an assassin's bullet, and the burden of Vietnam passed to Vice President Lyndon Johnson.

Johnson supported South Vietnam's ineffectual military rulers with extensive military and economic aid and, beginning in 1965, large numbers of U.S. ground troops. Ten years and 58,000 American deaths later, the communists with Russia-China's aid took over South Vietnam.

**1961** - Ngo Dinh Diem anti-communist, pro-U.S. in south; Ho Chi Minh pro-USSR in north National Liberation Front organized in south Dec. 20, 1960, by anti-Diem groups infiltration from north began 1961, communist People's Revolutionary Party gained leadership of NLF by 1962 JFK sought "limited partnership" with Diem, flexible response, counter-insurgency, nation-building, reform without revolution. CIA recruited Meo (Hmong) tribesmen in Laos, Montagnards in Central Highlands to fight Pathet Lao and Viet Minh Maxwell Taylor and Green Berets May 1961 Operation Ranch Hand Nov. 1961 - 18m gals herbicides (2/3 was Agent Orange) on 8% land area by 1971.

**1962** - MAAG (Truman's Military Advisory and Assistance Group) replaced by MACV (Military Assistance Command, Vietnam) Feb. 12, 1962, under Gen. Paul Harkins and Project Beef-Up - 11300 advisors sent during 1962, with 300 aircraft, automatic rifles, napalm, penicillin - 16000 advisors by Nov. 1963 Operation Sunrise - strategic hamlet program - 6800 built by Nov. 1963 Texas group awarded \$2b to construct bases at Saigon, Danang, Cam Ranh Bay, Qui Nonh 1963 Battle of Ap Bac Jan. 2, 1963 in Mekong Delta - 350 VC attacked by 2 ARVN battalions with 5 new HU-1 Iroquois helicopters, but ARVN reluctant to fight, all helicopters shot down, 3 U.S. pilots killed - Lt. Col. John Vann led 13 M113 armoured personnel carriers into village after ARVN refused to advance - battle revealed weakness of popular support for the Diem Catholic

urban mercantile elite government that had abolished the village electoral system in 1956, failed to implement land reform, followed anti-Buddhist repression.

JFK State of Union speech Jan. 14 declared that “aggression blunted in Vietnam” JCS sent investigation team Jan. 18 - Joe Mendenhall said VC getting stronger infiltration from NV grew from 850 per month to 1700 per month, with new Russian heavy weapons imported by fishing boats - 81mm mortars with 2-mile range, 75mm recoilless rifle - launched major offensive in Delta that destroyed strategic hamlets and captured 200,000 U.S. weapons by Nov. Buddhist riots May 8 led by Tri Quang – Diem’s troops fired into Buddhist crowd and killed 8 - immolation suicide of Quang Duc June 11 Diem assault on Buddhist pagodas Aug. 20 - martial law - 1400 arrested JFK feared that the U.S. would “lose” Vietnam like Truman lost China in '49 - replaced Nolting with new ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge in Aug. - Rusk cable to Lodge Aug. 24 to encourage SV generals planning coup to overthrow Diem - JFK approved on Oct 5 the selective suspension of aid to Diem - Rusk cable to Lodge Oct. 6 “while we do not wish to stimulate a coup,” the U.S. would support a more popular government – Diem assassinated Nov.2.

JFK approved on Nov 20 McNamara's Plan 34A, covert operations in NV including commando raids, kidnapping, mercenaries, parachute sabotage teams, U.S. Navy intelligence-gathering DeSoto patrols . JFK assassinated in Dallas Nov. 22.<sup>5</sup>

Stanley Karnow, who won a Pulitzer Prize in 1990 for *In Our Image: America's Empire in the Philippines*, is the author of *Vietnam: A History* Senior General Vo Nguyen Giap



General Vo Nguyen Giap<sup>6</sup>

---

<sup>5</sup> <http://www.diggerhistory.info/pages-leaders/south-vietnam.htm>

Senior General Vo Nguyen Giap was, and is, the only PAVN figure known at all well outside of Vietnam, the only PAVN general mentioned in most counts of the Vietnam war, and the only Vietnamese communist military leader about whom a full length biography has been written. The disparity between General Giap and the others-the lone figure standing in the forefront of a legion of shadowy Vietnamese communist generals-assures him a prominent place in Vietnam's history.

But history's judgment on him, as general, is yet to be rendered. The three horses pulling the chariot of war are leadership, organization and strategy. The ideal general in any army would possess to perfection each of these in careful combination. Evaluating the performance of General Giap, therefore, must be in terms of his performance as leader, organizer and strategist, all three. While the jury is still deliberating, this much about him seems reasonably clear: he was a competent commander of men but not a brilliant one; he was a first rate military organizer once the innovative conceptual work was past, a good builder and administrator of the military apparatus after the grand scheme had been devised; as a strategist he was at best a gifted amateur. Giap when he started the first Platoon of the North Vietnamese Army with 344 men in 1944.

Associates also have described him as forceful, arrogant, impatient and dogmatic. At least in earlier years, he was ruthlessly ambitious and extraordinarily energetic, with a touch of vanity suggesting to interviewers that he should be considered an Asian Napoleon. He is said to be fiercely loyal to those of his political faction who grant him unreserved loyalty.

He once told an associate that he took a "Darwinian view" of politics, and is said always to have been indifferent to arguments or reasoning based mainly on dogma. He always has been surrounded by political enemies and the victim of decades of sly whispers campaigns so common in Vietnam. (A typical whisper: General Dung, not Giap, planned the final successful at the battle of Dien Bien Phu because Giap had been struck down by diarrhoea.)

Vo Nguyen Giap was born, by his account, in 1912 in the village of An Xa, Quang Binh province, although other reports say he was born into a peasant family, but former associates say his family was impoverished mandarin of lower rank. His father worked the land, rented out land to neighbours, and was not poor. More important as a social indicator in Vietnam, his father was literate and familiar with the Confucian classics. Giap, in manner and in his writings, demonstrated a strong Confucian background. At 14, Giap became a messenger for the Haiphong Power Company and shortly thereafter joined the Tan Viet Cach Mang Dang, a romantically-styled revolutionary youth group. Two years later he entered Quoc Hoc, a French-run lycee in Hue, from which two years later, according to his account, he was expelled for continued Tan Viet movement activities. In 1933, at the age of twenty-one, Giap enrolled in Hanoi University. He studied for three years and was awarded a degree falling between a bachelor and Master of

---

<sup>6</sup> <http://www.flonnet.com/fl2106/stories/20040326000306100.htm>



Arts (doctorates were not awarded in Vietnam, only in France). Had he completed a fourth year he automatically would have been named a district governor upon graduation, but he failed his fourth year entrance examination.

While in Hanoi University, Giap met one Dang Xuan Khu, later known as Trung him to communism. During this same period Giap came to know another young Vietnamese who would be touched by destiny, Ngo Dinh Diem. Giap, then still something of a Fabian socialist, and Diem, who might be described as a right wing nationalist revolutionary, spend evenings together trying to proselytise each other.

While studying law at the University, Giap supported himself by teaching history at the Thanh Long High School, operated by Huynh Thuc Khang, another major figure in Vietnamese affairs. Former students say Giap loved to diagram on the blackboard the many military campaigns of Napoleon, and that he portrayed Napoleon in highly revolutionary terms.

In 1939, he published his first book, co-authored with Trung Chinh titled *The Peasant Question*, which argued not very originally that a communist revolution could be peasant-based as well as proletarian-based. In September 1939, with the French crackdown on communist, Giap fled to China where he met Ho Chi Minh for the first time; he was with Ho at the Chingsi (China) Conference in May 1941, when the Viet Minh was formed. At the end of 1941 Giap found himself back in Vietnam, in the mountains, with orders to begin organizational and intelligence work among the Montagnards. Working with a local bandit named Chu Van Tan, Giap spent World War II running a network of agents throughout northern Vietnam. The information collected, mostly about the Japanese in Indochina, went to the Chinese Nationalist in exchange for military and financial assistance which in turn, supported communist organization building. Giap had little military prowess at his command, however, and used what he did have to systematically liquidate rice landlords who opposed the communist.

On December 22, 1944, after about two years of recruiting, training and military experimenting, Giap fielded the first of his armed propaganda teams, and forerunner of PAVN. By mid-1945 he had some 10,000 men, if not soldiers, at his command. During these early years, Giap led Party efforts at organization busting which, with the connivance of the French, emasculated competing non-communist nationalist organizations, killing perhaps some 10,00 individuals (although these figures come from surviving nationalist and may be exaggerated). One of the liquidation techniques used by Giap's men was to tie victims together in batches, like cordwood, and toss them into the Red River, the victims thus drowning while floating out to sea a method referred to as "crab fishing." Giap's purge also extended to the newly created Viet Minh government: of the 360 original National Assembly members elected in 1946, only 291 actually took their seats, of whom only 37 were official opposition and only 20 of these were left at the end of the first session. Giap arrested some 200 during the session, some of whom were shot. He also ordered the execution of the famed and highly popular South Vietnamese Viet Minh leader, Nguyen



Binh. Giap sent Binh into an ambush and he died with a personal letter from Giap in his pocket. He also was carrying a diary which made it clear he knew of Giap's duplicity, but Binh went to his death in much the same manner in which the old Bolshevik, Rubashov, in darkness at Noon. Giap later confessed to a friend, "I was forced to sacrifice Nguyen Binh."

With the Viet Minh war Giap faced his most challenging task, converting peasants cum guerrillas into fully trained soldiers through a combination of military training and political indoctrination. He built an effective army. Colonial powers always controlled the colonial countryside with only token military forces; they controlled the peasants because the peasants permitted themselves to be controlled. Giap built an army that changed that in Indochina.

In military operations in both the Viet Minh and Vietnam Wars, Giap was cautious and so meticulous in planning that operations frequently were delayed because either they or the moment was premature. Giap's caution and policies led his opponents to underestimate both his military strength and his tactical skill. Although as someone noted, in war everyone habitually underestimates everyone else. Historians, particularly French historians, tend to case Giap in larger than life terms; they write of his flashing brilliance as a strategic and tactical military genius. But there is little objective proof of this. Perhaps the French write him large as a slave for bruised French ego. Giap's victories have been due less to brilliant or even incisive thinking than to energy, audacity and meticulous planning. And his defeats clearly are due to serious shortcomings as a military commander: a tendency to hold on too long, to refuse to break victory to intoxicate and lead to the taking of excessive and even insane chances in trying to strike a bold second blow; a preoccupation, while fighting the "people's war," with real estate, attempting to sweep the enemy out of an area that may or may not be militarily important.

Giap always was at his best when he was moving men and supplies around a battlefield, far faster than his foes had any right to expect. He did this against the French in 1951, infiltrating an entire army through their lines in the Red River Delta, and again in advance of the Tet offensive in 1968 when he positioned thousands of men and tons of supplies for a simultaneous attack on thirty-five major South Vietnamese population centres. If Giap is a genius as a general at all, he is, as the late Bernard Fall put it, a logistic genius. General Giap's strategic thinking early in the Vietnam War, from 1959 until at least 1966, was to let the NLF and PLAF do it by the Viet Minh War book. Cadres and battle plans in the form of textbooks were sent down the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Southern elements were instructed in the proper mobilization and motivation techniques, cantered on the orthodox dau tranh strategy that had worked with the French and in which Giap had full faith. Certain adjustments might be necessary with respect to political dau tranh and some minor adaptations of armed dau tranh might be required, his writings at this time indicated but essentially the necessary doctrine was in existence and was in place.

What changed Giap's thinking, and his assumption that the war against the Americans could be a continuation of the war against the French, was the battle of Ia Drang Valley, the first truly important battle of the war. Giap's troops veterans of Dien Bien Phu, when thrown against green First Cavalry Division soldiers, experienced for the first time the full meaning of American-style conduct of war: the helicopters, the lightweight bullet, sophisticated communications, computerized military planning, an army that moved mostly vertically and hardly ever walked. Technology had revolutionized warfare, Giap acknowledged in *Big Victory, Great Task*, a book written to outline his strategic response to the U.S. intervention. The answer he said, was to match the American advantage in mass and movement or, where not possible, to shunt it aside. He was still searching for the winning formula when suddenly he was handed victory. The South Vietnamese Army which had stood and fought under far worse conditions in January 1975, under minor military pressure, began to collapse. Soon in could not fight coherently. Giap was handed a victory he neither expected at the time nor deserved. How much command responsibility Giap had in the last days of the war, in 1975, is debated - much direction had passed to General Dung but is unimportant in terms of distributing laurels, since none was deserved by any PAVN general.

After the Vietnam War General Giap slowly began to fade the scene, withdrawing gradually from day-to-day command of PAVN. General Dung began to take up the reins of authority. Giap was given a series of relatively important short term task force assignments. He supervised the initial assumption by PAVN of various production and other post-war economic duties. He reorganized and downgraded the PAVN political commissar system, as the battle organized Reds and Experts tilted ever more clearly towards the latter. He defended PAVN's budget against the sniping attack of cadres in the economic sector.

Giap proved to be painfully correct and, for the sin of being right when all others are wrong in a collective leadership decision-making process, was eased out of Politburo level politics. Apparently all factions ganged up on him, but his removal was designed to eliminate Giap as factional infighting without tarnishing Giap the legend. It appears he did not resist this power play as he might have done, with possibly bloody consequences, which may be a tribute to his better judgements.

Today Giap still is on the Vietnamese scene, but plays a lesser role. He has taken upon himself the task of lifting Vietnam by its technological boot straps, has become the leading figure in the drive to raise the country's technical and scientific capability. This requires, among other things, soliciting continued Soviet assistance, something Giap is able to do well because of the regard for him in the USSR. He confers frequently with Soviet advisors in Hanoi and in the Soviet Union; in 1980 he went to Moscow three times in a nine-month period.

General Giap has been a prolific writer and he continues to publish although Big Victory, Great Task is more innovative and original. His most interesting book is Dien Bien Phu, while his worst certainly is Once Again We Will Win, his initial assessment of what was required to defeat the Americans which is virtually devoid of correct factual and technical judgments.<sup>7</sup>

### **Prime Minister of SVN, Major General Nguyen Cao Ky**

Ngo Dinh Diem, the first elected President of the Republic of South Vietnam: The tragic Beginning of how American took control of the Vietnam War

On the way to church on November 2nd, 1963, the Catholic President Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother Nhu were murdered by Captain Nhung - at the order of General Mai Huu Xuan, General Big Minh, and CIA Lou Conien. President Diem was betrayed by his American friends and President Kennedy. Ten years later President Thieu and the South Vietnamese were once again betrayed by President Nixon, Henry Kissinger at Paris conference. The tragic end came twelve years later on April 30th, 1975.



Nguyen Cao Ky

Eventually three million Vietnamese fled the country, hundreds of thousands of “boat-people” died in the China sea, and countless thousands of former ARVN Officers, government officials died in "re-education" camps. Vietnam became one of the poorest countries in the world.

The U.S. Regime initially supported President Diem but six years later supported a coup d'etat by ARVN Military Junta (Mai Huu Xuan and other Generals) who ordered the murder of President

---

<sup>7</sup> [http://www.diggerhistory.info/pages-leaders/enemy\\_svn.htm](http://www.diggerhistory.info/pages-leaders/enemy_svn.htm)

Diem, his brother Nhu, Colonel Le Quang Tung, Colonel Ho Tan Quyen, LTC Le Quang Trieu and other Special Forces Staff.

To cover up the blunder, US press reported that President Diem was corrupted. When he was assassinated, he owned only one very small and simple home. The death of President Diem was a political embarrassment for President Kennedy.

Less than three weeks after President Ngo Dinh Diem was assassinated, President John F. Kennedy was likewise killed by an assassin's bullet, and the burden of Vietnam passed to Vice President Lyndon Johnson.

Johnson supported South Vietnam's ineffectual military rulers with extensive military and economic aid and, beginning in 1965, large numbers of U.S. ground troops. Ten years and 58,000 American deaths later, the communists with Russia-China's aid took over South Vietnam.

### **Nguyen Van Thieu, President of South Vietnam 1976-9175**



Nguyen Van Thieu, born April 5, 1923, was president of South Vietnam from 1967 until it was overrun by North Vietnamese armed forces in 1975. From 1945 to 1946, Thieu joined Ho Chi Minh's Viet Minh but disagreed with its communist sympathies. He fought with the French from 1946 to 1954 against the Viet Minh and rose in the South Vietnamese Army.

A leader of the 1963 coup d'état against Ngo Dinh Diem, he became South Vietnam's military chief of state in 1965 and was elected president of a civilian government in 1967 and 1971.

When the Paris agreement to end the Vietnam War was announced on Jan. 24, 1973, he warned his people to be vigilant “because peace does not mean a long-lasting peace. I tell you that I believe this is solely a cease-fire agreement, no more, no less.”

After the fall of South Vietnam in 1975, he went to Taiwan, then to London. Thieu moved to Boston in 1989. He died there in 2001.

The invasion began by a series of heavy air strikes flown by F-5s, and A-37s, which prepared the ground for the advance of the 207th, 325th and 968th, all well-supported by artillery and tanks (one of the SRVAF F-5-pilots that participated in the invasion was Nguyen Thanh Trung, the same former pilot of the South Vietnamese Air Force, that bombed the presidential palace in Saigon, on 5 April 1975, before defecting to the North Vietnamese side).<sup>8</sup>

One continues to wonder about the true *raison d'être* of the offensive of the Small fireclay cup, openly started by the North-Vietnamese and the FNL in February 1968 in order to cause in the whole country a rising against the United States and the mode pro-American places from there at South Vietnam. The Communists were convinced that rising would be decisive and force the Americans to require peace. In fact, the offensive does not succeed in starting a general rising, in spite of its psychological success which accelerated the American withdrawal of Vietnam.<sup>9</sup>

Look, Vietminh and Vietcong still remind us the Khmer victims about their super-dirty demonic tricks of 1954 Geneva Agreement and 1973 Paris Agreement that they had won over the French colonialists and American imperialists was a great victory for Vietnamese diplomacy and revolutionary. They also unabashedly bullshit to the world about restoring peace in Indochina 50 years ago, (See more “Yvon refugees scattered to everywhere on this earth”) and in the name of national reunification of Vietnam. Former Vietminh and Vietcong did not mention about the present South Vietnam/Khmer Krom that they have illegally plundered from Cambodians at all, is to read like:

### **National workshop discusses 1954 Geneva agreement**

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs organised a national workshop in Hanoi on Friday to discuss the significance and lessons learnt from the signing of the Geneva Agreement to restore peace in the Indochina 50 years ago.

Deputy Prime Minister Vu Khoan, Foreign Minister Nguyen Dy Nien and more than 100 scholars attended the workshop. Addressing the event, Mr Nien highlighted the results and significance of the 1954 Geneva Conference in relation to the revolutionary cause of Vietnam and the world. He said the signing of the Geneva Agreement was a great victory for Vietnamese diplomacy which helped elevate the country's role and prestige in the international arena. “The Geneva Agreement was a political commitment of international legal validity,” Mr Nien said, “It laid a firm foundation for the Vietnamese people to continue the resistance war against American aggressors, which culminated in the signing of the 1973 Paris Agreement, and lead to the liberation of the south and national reunification. In his address, Mr Khoan emphasised the great significance of the Geneva Conference in which half the country was liberated. It also served as

---

<sup>8</sup> Indochina Database. Cambodia, 1954 - 1999; Part 3, By Albert Grandolini, Tom Cooper, & Troung. Jan 25, 2004, 06:25

<sup>9</sup> [http://amekhmer.free.fr/Site\\_Fr/geno\\_fr.htm](http://amekhmer.free.fr/Site_Fr/geno_fr.htm) (Then; Brother One)

a significant foundation for the southern region to continue the struggle for national reunification 20 years later. He spoke of some lessons drawn from the conference, including the maintenance of independence and self-reliance, the mobilisation and combination of forces to create national aggregate strength as well as the strategic tactics of the diplomatic sector. Fifteen reports presented at the workshop analysed the then international circumstance leading to the 1954 Geneva Conference, the influence of the Dien Bien Phu victory on the Geneva Conference and the influence of the conference on revolutionaries from Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and the world's national liberation movements, as well as valuable lessons on diplomatic struggles and their development in later periods. Mr Nien appreciated the delegates' reports and said the workshop was an opportunity to acknowledge the great contribution made by generations of Vietnamese diplomats in the process of national construction and development.<sup>10</sup>

Poshepny's CIA work in Laos began in 1961 during America's failed "secret war" against communist North Vietnamese, who carved the Ho Chi Minh Trail through Lao territory to attack US forces in South Vietnam. Pathet Lao communist fighters were also the CIA's foe. The Lao communists achieved victory in 1975 and continue to rule the tiny nation today.

"Over the years, I have worked closely in various capacities with many senior American military and clandestine leaders involved in Laos during the Vietnam war, including William Colby, former DCI [Director of Central Intelligence]; Theodore Shackley, former CIA station chief, Laos; Douglas Blaufarb, former CIA station chief, Laos; Larry Devlin, former CIA station chief, Laos; and others," said Mr Smith of the Center for Public Policy Analysis.

"Tony Poe epitomised what the late Theodore Shackley, former CIA station chief in Laos, called the 'Third Option'. America, to avoid the potential twin options of using nuclear or conventional forces to defend its interests, should instead rely on special, elite, clandestine forces to recruit, train and arm indigenous or tribal forces, to project power, protect its interests and counter guerrilla movements, terrorism or other attacks," he said. (By: RICHARD S. EHRLICH)

Are all taken at random from where Khmer Krom people reside by the Creators of Vietminh and Vietcong, and put upon an Island to either learn to live together in peace, or kill each other off in a Grand Experiment. And if they decided to kill each other off, then the Creators would decide to destroy humanity before humanity destroys itself. If only to spare the earth, where innocent non-human animals reside everyday.

All the Khmer Krom people were to be conned being given pieces which would allow them to make a boat, and sail away to freedom in the name of Khmer-Vietminh to drive the French colonialists and the American imperialists out of Indochina. The Creators of Vietminh and Vietcong reasoned that if they learned to live together in peace, then humanity could be spared extinction.

---

<sup>10</sup> [http://www.vov.org.vn/2004\\_07\\_16/english/chinhtri.htm#Fatherland](http://www.vov.org.vn/2004_07_16/english/chinhtri.htm#Fatherland)

In the meantime, the Vietcong had come across the Khmer Krom who were naively coned to listen to their tale of woe and lying. Both Vietminh and Vietcong promised all Khmer Krom people that a better life awaited them in Paradise if you-Khmer Krom would follow the Vietminh and Vietcong's plans to a tee. "This American and this South Vietnam only want war. So let us bring them war." The President Thieu agreed, as there was little choice with all the Vietcong propaganda being fed to the Americans.

North Vietnamese industry was not destroyed by airstrikes, and the CIA later noted:

"Twenty-seven months of U.S. bombing of North Vietnam have had remarkably little effect on Hanoi's overall strategy in prosecuting the war, on its confident view of long term communist prospects and on its political tactics regarding negotiations." Other reports gathered in the Pentagon Papers showed that Hanoi's war making capacity had hardly been affected, that its will had been strengthened by the bombing, its links with the USSR and China had been improved, and civilian morale had hardened.

Throughout the Vietnam build up, 1965-69, the principal in-house critics of the air war were to be found in the Systems Analysis Office of the secretary of Defense.

There was no agreement between military and civilian officials as to how many Communists were killed in the "boxes" ground out by the B-52s, but the evidence demonstrated that the bombing of base camps was the least effective technique of all. Moreover, despite the enormous number of "interdiction" flights against Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos over the past three years the Communists were getting through adequate supplies. Evidence in NSSM I suggested that no amount of air power could prevent them. The American embassy in Saigon, going further, warned that neither the bombing of the North nor that of the Trail had affected Hanoi's ability to wage the war as wished in the South.

Particularly in the use of air power, escalation was part of their strategy. Menu was launched in March 1969, and in 1970 Nixon expanded the free fire zone in Laos, sent B-52s over the Plain of Jar in Laos for the first time, and approved targets in North Vietnam that Lyndon Johnson had never allowed.<sup>11</sup>

The Air Force history notes that in 197 Nixon realized that the South Vietnamese Army was improving more slowly than troop withdrawals and so "bridged the gap...by applying air strikes for political purposes and by extending the geographic area of air interdiction-into Cambodia and back into North Vietnam."<sup>12</sup>

The Pentagon admitted openly that it would now use the full range of its air power in Cambodia, since any enemy there might "ultimately" threaten United States forces in Vietnam.

---

<sup>11</sup> William Shawcross: Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia (1986) Pp.210-211

<sup>12</sup> William Shawcross: Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia (1986) P.212



Its' the least costly way to protect our men-and why we should have any restrictions o the use of that air power to protect American lives, I don't know. "Unnamed officials told The New York Times that Cambodia was being used as a laboratory to test "public acceptance of the general process of gradually substituting helicopters and attack planes for foot soldiers, as American combat units are withdrawn from the Vietnam War."'<sup>13</sup>

At the end of March, Hanoi launched its massive spring offensive into South Vietnam. Soviet-made tanks and North Vietnamese divisions poured over the Demilitarized Zone and across the Cambodian border, demonstrating how short-lived the "brilliant success" of the 1970 invasion of the sanctuaries had been. The war seeped cross Vietnam, and for a few weeks in April it seemed that the South Vietnamese might be routed and Nixon confronted with a defeat a few months before the Presidential election.

Air power was called upon to avert the awful possibility. Nixon launched hundred more planes against the North. Haiphong was bombed and mined. In the South immense numbers of strategic and tactical bombers were thrown into close air support of Thieu's beleaguered troops.<sup>14</sup>

Hanoi agreed to allow Thieu to remain in place while elections were arranged. The Americans acknowledged the presence of North Vietnamese troops within South Vietnam. By the middle of 1972 this was a huge concession; altogether, Hanoi had now moved about 145, 000 men into the South. It was the legitimation of Hanoi's presence that most enraged Thieu, and it was his understandable resistance that had snatched "peace" from Kissinger's hand in October 1972.

Under the code name "Operation Enhance" the administration shipped an astonishing new armoury to Saigon; this made the South Vietnamese air force the fourth largest in the world. Then the Th white House demonstrated its resolve by the Christmas bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong.<sup>15</sup>

Once again Thieu's position has to be considered. Nixon's secret promise of military support undercut any incentive the South Vietnamese might have had to implement the political sections of the Paris Agreement. They provided Thieu with the insurance necessary to continue prosecuting the war.

Now the Paris Agreement proscribed further bombing of North or South Vietnam and, it a cease-fire was reached in Laos or Cambodia, there as well.<sup>16</sup>

This argument was weakened by the fact that the Paris Agreement had countenanced the continued presence of "approximately 145, 000" North Vietnamese soldiers in South Vietnam.<sup>17</sup>

---

<sup>13</sup> William Shawcross: Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia (1986) Pp.214

<sup>14</sup> William Shawcross: Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia (1986) P.218

<sup>15</sup> William Shawcross: Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia (1986) P.260

<sup>16</sup> William Shawcross: Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia (1986) Pp.264-265



All American troops and POWS had left Vietnam by the end of March. In April the administration began to warn that a breakdown of the cease-fire was possible because of Communists breaches in both Vietnam and Cambodia.

As threatening gesture, the United States resumed bombing of Laos, suspended mine-clearing operations in Haiphong and restored reconnaissance flights, banned by the Paris Agreement, over North Vietnamese, Kissinger requested a new round of meetings in Paris, first between William Sullivan and Hanoi's Vice Foreign Minister, Nguyen Co Thach, later between Le Duc Tho and himself.<sup>18</sup>

In Vietnam, neither side had launched an all-out offensive since the Paris Agreement, but each had tried continually to increase its holdings of land and people at the cost of many thousands. The Senator Refugee Subcommittee claimed that the fighting in the first year of "peace with honor" had created 818, 700 new refugees in Vietnam, far more than in any year since 1968, save 1972. Averages of 141 people were being killed each day. "The Vietnamese have, in short, suffered more in one year of peace with honor than America experienced in a decade of war," the subcommittee reported.<sup>19</sup>

Kissinger claimed that "a secure peace" in Vietnam was an important part of Nixon's search for "worldwide structure of peace" and throughout the spring of 1974 the White House pressed for more military aid to Saigon. But Watergate was pushing even conservatives away from the commitment. Republican Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona declared, "We can scratch Vietnam." The Senate approved an amendment to bar further military aid to Vietnam after July 1974.<sup>20</sup>

But Rodino warned that if the Article was introduced the Republican would say, "Nixon's the guy who saved the world, brought peace and all that crap."<sup>21</sup>

Khmer Krom people, who have been living on their own lands for so many centuries, plant rice in the fields, but they all have to pay taxes to the Vietnamese Government. Vietnamese are so afraid of Khmer people, but they are not afraid of French or Americans. Why? Because French and American could not endure the hot climate in South East Asia, who could neither drink any water from the straight rivers or ponds nor eat any leaves from any trees according to Mrs Yiey Tien's.

Also, recently, one of Yuon world Political Analysts, who is living in USA, carefully warns to his Yuon people that, "Be aware of Khmer people uprising in the near future" according to Voice

---

<sup>17</sup> William Shawcross: Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia (1986) P.287

<sup>18</sup> William Shawcross: Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia (1986) P.282

<sup>19</sup> William Shawcross: Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia (1986) P.324

<sup>20</sup> William Shawcross: Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia (1986) P.325

<sup>21</sup> William Shawcross: Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia (1986) P.331

of Khmer Krom in May 2004, after members of Yuon association went to meet and interview with Khmer Krom Federation.

Why did Yuon world political analyst carefully warn to his Yuon people in Srok Yuon about Khmer uprising like this? Why didn't he mention literally about Khmer Krom people uprising? Because he feels very embarrassed if he said literally about Khmer Krom people uprising. It also means, if he said literally about Khmer Krom uprising, to say that Yuon illegally plundered Khmer Krom lands from Cambodians in the eyes of world and especially in the eyes of all Cambodians.

Why are all murderous Yuon Communist leaders still trying from the bottom of its hearts to bullshit to the world over again and again like this? As I've already clearly mentioned not only Khmer Krom who are forced out of their lands to live everywhere on this planet including myself-writer of this article, Yuon, Cambodian, Cham/Montagnards, Laotians and Hmong refugees...etc. who are brutally, unfairly and wickedly dispersed by the murderous Yuon dictatorial communist leaders. But one reason all murderous Yuon dictatorial communist leaders could not conceal its super-dirty demonic tricks are because they couldn't kill all Cambodian people in one day.

The French viceroy, the senior government official in French Indochina, lacked sufficient armed forces to resist. He agreed to Japanese demands and was reduced to a figurehead authority. Seizing the opportunity, Ho Chi Minh organized a broad national front group called the League for the Independence of Vietnam (Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh, or Viet Minh for short) and built up guerrilla forces in preparation for an uprising at war's end. To win wide popular support, the Viet Minh program emphasised national independence and moderate reform rather than openly Communist aims. When Japan surrendered to the Allies in August 1945, Viet Minh forces rose throughout the country and, in what is known as the August Revolution, declared the establishment of an independent republic with its capital at Hanoi.

The French, however, were unwilling to concede independence, and in late 1945 they seized control over the southern provinces from retreating Viet Minh and other nationalist forces. Negotiations to seek compromise solution were held in France in the summer of 1946, but they failed to resolve differences. War broke out in December when Viet Minh military units attacked French positions in Hanoi and then retreated to the mountains north of the Red River Delta.

The Expulsion of the French Part section The Franco-Viet Minh conflict (now often called the First Indochina War) lasted nearly eight years. The Viet Minh set up their headquarters in the mountainous area between the Red River valley and the Chinese border and built up their forces for a major counter-offensive. After failing to capture Ho Chi Minh and destroy the guerrilla movement, the French formed a rival Vietnamese government under Bao Dai, the last emperor of the Nguyen dynasty. In August 1945 Bao Dai had abdicated the throne in favor of Ho Chi Minh's republic, which was formally declared in September. Viet Minh forces lacked the strength to

defeat the French, but the movement had earned sufficient popularity among the Vietnamese people to prevent French victory.

In 1950 the United States increasingly concerned about Communist advances in Asia recognized Bao Dai's government and began to provide military and economic aid to the French. In turn, the Viet Minh (still dominated by Ho Chi Minh's ICP) sought assistance from the new Communist government in China.

The war was a virtual stalemate for three years. In France, however, the public grew weary of the war in Indochina. In March 1954 Viet Minh forces attacked Dien Bien Phu, the French military outpost in the isolated town of Dien Bien. The dispirited government in France agreed to hold negotiations on a peace agreement at Geneva, Switzerland. The French outpost fell to a Viet Minh assault on May 7, the night before negotiations began at Geneva (Dien Bien Phu, Battle of).<sup>22</sup>

All Indochinese Communism originates from Vietnam. The Indochinese Communist Party, formed in 1930, originally consisted entirely of Vietnamese cadres. They followed Comintern policy of the period and envisaged the replacement of French Indochina by a socialist federation of the three countries. One Communist document of 1934, for example, stated: "there is no place for considering a Cambodian revolution on its own. There can only be an Indochina revolution."

In 1941 the Indochinese Communist party went underground. The struggle against the French and Japanese was led by a new united front, the Vietminh, which was dominated by the Party. The Vietminh was active in all three countries of Indochina recruiting Laotians and Khmers. By the end of the decade the Vietminh was still the only important anti-colonial force in Indochina, and it was overwhelmingly Vietnamese.<sup>23</sup>

In Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh, the leader of the Communist resistance, the Vietminh, refused to accept Bao Dai's declaration and seized Hanoi.

In 1954 the Geneva Peace Conference on Indochina agreed to the temporary division of Vietnam into North and South.<sup>24</sup>

June 13, 1966, Pentagon approve the recommendation by Joint Chief to organize, train, and equip an indigenous force of intelligence agents, reconnaissance teams, and reaction teams for possible future employment in cross-border operation into Cambodia.

March 19, 1968, US Embassy in Vietnam telegram to the State Dept. concerning SEA Coordinating Committee recommendations.<sup>25</sup>

---

<sup>22</sup> ENCARTA ENCYCLOPEDIA

<sup>23</sup> William Shawcross: Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia (1986) P.237

<sup>24</sup> William Shawcross: Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia (1986) Pp.47-48

He recognised that Tet 1968 had been a political defeat for Washington, even if the Vietcong infrastructure had been badly mauled. The North Vietnamese and the Americans would discuss military matters: the South Vietnamese government and the NLF would negotiate political changes. The Americans objectives would be to avoid military defeat “or a change in the political structure of South Vietnam brought about by external military force.” Washington must try to effect a staged withdrawal of both North Vietnamese and American forces; any discussion of the future political composition of South Vietnam must be left to the Vietnamese.<sup>26</sup>

During the war between the North and the South, both sides had the same plans and goals. The Viet Cong used and forced the Khmer Krom villagers to supply them with food, many young women for their entertainment. Those who refused were killed publicly in order to scare the villagers. It was reported to the South Vietnamese government that the villagers supported the enemy. Then the government sent troops to destroy that village. The villagers were arrested, tortured, imprisoned and killed. The North Vietnamese flew the Viet Cong flag in Khmer Krom villages and then reported to the South Vietnamese government that the village was full of Viet Cong and needed to be destroyed. The government gladly sent the Vietnamese or U.S. air strikes to destroy that village along with the people in it.

They also frightened the Khmer Krom villagers by saying that the U.S. air strikes would destroy their village, but that it would be safe for the villagers to hide with them in the jungle. So, many Khmer Krom villagers were far from the southern government's control, had moved into the jungle and moved around with the Viet Cong since their villages had been burnt. They had no place to go and slaved for the Viet Cong. They forbade the Khmer Krom people to have babies. Crying babies would make it easy for the enemy to spot them, so they killed all babies. Thousands of other Khmer Krom villagers got killed by the South Vietnamese troops. The Vietnamese are very clever. They exterminated our Khmer Krom race by logical methods, so that no one in the world would know that they intentionally do it. Our Khmer Krom population has not increased for many years.

After all the plans, which we already described, were not achieved according to their will in effacing our compatriots in Khmer Krom, the brutal Yuon imperialists who formed another plan.

This time, the source of the schemes killing off Khmers in Khmer Krom came from Hanoi (North Yuon) under the sign of “National Liberation”. (Sic)

This Movement, if we didn't consider very carefully and trace the events of the past history. We would not pay attention too much to it. By contrast, if we really focus on the today's events of Yuon Imperialists, we –Khmer must be so worried.

---

<sup>25</sup> <http://www.geocities.com/khmerchronology/>

<sup>26</sup> William Shawcross: Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia (1986) P.88

To let compatriots understand about the brutal plans. I would like to show those plans in a brief:

- In September 1960, Hanoi appealed to the people in South Yuon/Vietnam rising to liberate.
- On 20 December 1960, South Yuon (Vietcong) received orders, and formed National Liberation Front of South Vietnam/FNL.
- In February 1961, this Front formed “Force Armées De Liberation/F.A.L).

The activities of Yuon Vietcong, had no another motive but killing off our compatriots continuously according to their secret plans were to do whatever was to get rid of all Khmer Krom people from Khmer Krom land in order to be easy for them to alter the history.

During the reign of Yuon Vietcong, was the phase of the bitter history that our compatriots in Khmer Krom had to face to the torture so painfully that all Khmer children nationalists can not forget at all. The cries of the parents who were brutally separated from their children. The cries of the wives who were separated from their husbands. The sadness of the children who were separated from their parents were echoed all over the Khmer Krom like earthquake and was a sign of the brutallest tragedies that our Khmers living there who had to suffer tremendously painfully from the Yuon Imperialist Vietcong and the puppets of the government of Yuon Prei Nokor. The means of killing off our compatriots of the Yuon imperialists are countless that really shocked my feeling terribly that made me can't nearly continue to write this anymore because the sign of the separations, suffering due to separation that were taken place from the killing off our compatriots in Khmer Krom, which made me so painful in my heart about the brutal torture and inhumanity of the Yuon imperialists.

The political movement of Vietcong was made up under the diamond sign of “National Liberation”. Who do they liberate from whom? We answer literally that: “They liberate Khmer Krom from our compatriots in Khmer Krom is to be owned by their own only.”

Why can't we answer like that? If during the reign of Vietcong was born at once, we didn't see any foreigners came to control and oppress Yuon yet.

According to Yuon Vietcong's propaganda (Communist Yuon) publicly declared that they liberate the land from the American Imperialists (Sic). Was their propaganda sound if in those days there was no American stepping on the South Vietnam yet? Until 8 February 1962, then Americans brought their troops in to South Vietnam. Just only this, we can see clearly about the motives of plundering Khmer Krom land of Yuon indisputably.

On the other hand, the government of Yuon Prei Nokor pleaded the Americans to come to Srok Yuon is also another new plan of Yuon imperialists in diverting easily the world pacifists' opinions to killing off our compatriots in Khmer Krom like Vietcong, too. Therefore, Yuon fought against each other was a pretext for concealing the reality of their goal only.

As we already know the war in Yuon, have had nearly 30 years or so. At the moment, that dirty war is broken out fiercely. The war has lasted so long for thirty years like this, should we focus, too, because the history is never recorded in a world war that has been lasted so long like this. When will this dirty war, and of which century will end? This problem if, according to the event of Vietnam War, we clearly can't assume at all, because is to say that the Yuon Imperialists wagged war to achieve their gaols. Therefore, if they haven't achieved their goals yet is they still continue to wag war. This is a great plan of Yuon who we have to be aware of. For what do Yuon imperialists wag war? For peace or for plundering land from us? This is not hard to understand because if, as a matter of fact, the Yuon Imperialists wagged war for peace, really. The peace would have come true a long time ago because as we know, the world pacifists, who tried to find peace for the Vietnamese, be never careless.

They wagged war only to find an opportunity to eliminate Khmer nationals in Khmer Krom and heritages from Khmer Krom first, and then they find peace in the end.

In eliminating Khmer heritages and killing off our compatriots in Khmer Krom is on the brink of extinction. Especially there were great numbers of Wats/temples that the Yuon bandits destroyed, now became completely wilderness we ought to be nostalgia and so disappointed.<sup>27</sup>

P. 40: Visits to the north-eastern made owing to the relative inaccessibility of these sparsely settled regions. I cannot personally comment on any incursions into these areas other than to say that is was generally accepted in Phnom Penh that the Vietminh had long had a small presence there, dating back to the war with the French.

Further south, the great rubber plantations of Kompong Cham were wholly manned by Vietnamese workers and the large population of Vietnamese that had settled on the border areas of the Mekong delta in Cambodia could easily mask any small-scale Viet Cong presence.

The Cambodians were powerless to prevent any use of their territory with the small army at their disposal and had no inclination to start a fight with a large and belligerent neighbour whom they had known through centuries of trouble.

Trained and armed by the North Vietnamese and with a hard core of Khmer Vietminh who had lived in Hanoi, the newly-emergent Khmer Rouge became a fighting force, brave but merciless, knowing only the absolutes of win or lose. We win: you die.<sup>28</sup>

The gross violation of Khmer Krom human rights during the World War II in 1945 by the communist Viet Minh, the armed movement of the current Vietnamese communist government had cremated alive ten of thousands of Khmer Krom people. The Vietnamese communist leaders who have been the architects of the WWII Khmer Krom Genocide remain free until today, and

---

<sup>27</sup> Kim Sa Ol: Khmer Krom land (1971) Pp.57-66

<sup>28</sup> Colin Pratt: Killing the Khmer (2002) P.49



the inquiries of their crimes against humanity of the Khmer Krom by an international tribunal have not been done by the world justice systems to these days. In similar manner with the Khmer Krom's atrocities, the Jewish People have suffered genocide caused by the Nazi-Germany during the WWII in Europe. However, the Jewish victims of genocide have been more fortunate than the Khmer Krom. They have had the protection of the international justice systems. As the results, the Nazi-Germany's criminals who committed crimes against humanity of the Jewish People during the WWII have faced the international tribunal. The remaining Nazi criminals who are still at large around the world today are sought after by the international justice systems. Posted by [user](#) - Monday, December 08 2003 @ 16:35:15 PST (From the editorial of the Voice of Kampuchea Krom, February 24, 2003 By Mr. Trieu Funan)

This is a short story of one Vietnamese monk who was a leader of a religious sect known as the Hoa Hao. Part of the mission of this sect was to preach against the French rule. The name was Huynh Phu So. He was a 20-year-old Buddhist monk, severely ill. In 1939, his illness was miraculously healed on one stormy night. After recovering from the sickness, he started preaching with eloquent tone. He saw a need to reform Buddhism in Vietnam. Those who saw the miracle of healing themselves became the first converts of Huynh Phu So. Some called him the "living Buddha." The words spread and he became well known throughout South Vietnam. Phu So made prophecies about the beginning of World War II, the fall of France, and the Japanese invasion of Indochina. All came true.

The French did not feel easy about this monk and they labelled him as having a mental illness. So they put Phu So in a mental hospital. While at the hospital, Phu So preached to his psychiatrist. The psychiatrist psychiatrically collapsed under the influence of the preaching of Phu So and he too became his convert. The French learned about this conversion and sent Phu So to Laos to live in exile. In 1941, Phu So returned home, but he went into obscurity. His movement continued. Hoa Hao and another religious sect known as Cao Dai both have a total of 3 million followers today. They were powerful in Vietnamese politics until 1975 when the communists captured Saigon.

The French imposed harsh rule over the Vietnamese, like they did to the Khmer people. This brought the emergence of rebellious factions like Ho Chi Minh's communism and the two religious sects Cao Dai and Hoa Hao. The intention of the French colony in Southeast Asia was to "discourage" the native culture and replace it with their Christianity through Catholic conversions. The term "discourage" is loosely used here. Perhaps the term "pulverize" is more appropriate. Three Vietnamese emperors (Minh Mang, Thieu Tri, and Tu Duc) during the Nguyen dynasty were not pleasantly receptive to the French rule and cultural pulverization of the Vietnamese. They responded by killing many Christians during the 19th century. The French answered by waging war against Vietnam, and in 1862, Saigon fell to the French. (One Vietnamese Monk, Posted By: Kee (207.111.96.68) Date: Saturday, 10 April 2004, at 5:57 p.m. One Vietnamese Monk Kee. April 10, 2004)

Kung Sim, my father, was governor (Chauvay Srok) of Preah Trapeang, home of Khmer intellectuals of Kampuchea Krom. Preah Trapeang was also the province of the decedents of Royal families of Khmer King Chey Chetha II who lost Khmer Land to Vietnam. My father was

an engineer and an alumni of French Government School (Ecole Nationale d' Administration). He lost his job after Youn Dot Khmer. He organized Khmer revenge. He fled to Battambang, Cambodia. He kept secret his identity. He was recruited by French administration just after his arrival in Battambang to build the railway from Battambang City to Poipet.

At Battambang, in 1947, he found that the Vietnamese organization to swallow Cambodia was already much more advanced and stronger than the one he knew very well in Kampuchea Krom. Battambang was stratified in four levels: At the top was the French administration. After the French, were the Vietnamese officers of French administration and team leaders of every French support-organization. There were already Vietminh villages well organized in Battambang since Thailand occupation of Battambang.

At the third level was Khmer. Khmer represented the majority of Battambang people. The majority of Battambang people were Khmer Krom from Preah Trapeang. At the fourth level were people pro-Thai. That fourth popular couch had no strong link to Cambodia.

Chinese people considered themselves as immigrants who came to live in harmony with Khmer people and did not want to get involved in political activity. But Chinese people living in Cambodia were strong supporters of Cambodia.

Finally, in other word, in Cambodia, all governmental decision was hold in French hand through Vietnamese. Vietnamese officers were therefore in influential position to shape French policy in Cambodia.

Khmer Krom and Buddhist monks brought to Cambodia knowing how of village organization, their motto, hold on our own hand the destiny of our village. Samdech Sangh Raja Chuon Nath, Samdech Sangh Preah Wannarat Iv Tuot, Lok Krou Achar Souk had to hide their origin of Preah Trapeang. They were erudite of government thinking and military organization.

Samdech Sangh Chuon Nath always advised us to take care of the people, the grass-root organization, take care of the village, assure and provide services, especially security, administration, economic, health, education and public works. Take initiative. "Don't wait. You should not wait for help from the royal government, the central power. Very often, you should act as if the central government were defeated by our traditional enemies. The government will need you anyway to do thing. All in all take full control of the village. That is the fundamental basic of any political activities," said he. Remember Utah. Utah is the state of Mormons. The Mormon controlled any grass-root organization, even the small social units of Utah. Therefore, the Mormons controlled the State of Utah.

My father came two times to Cambodia, the first time, in 1941, with a dozen of his friends. Khmer Krom had established during century a network helping each other to return back to live on the land of our ancestors, in Cambodia or Thailand. Cambodia and Thailand were the refuge



for Khmer Krom, a kind of Khmer Krom save-haven. When the repression in Vietnam was extreme, Khmer Krom fled to Cambodia or Thailand to escape the repression.

Khmer Krom network spreaded from Kampuchea Krom to Thailand, Surin. The network assured the logistic support by providing foods, a place to sleep and information, who to contact. My father carried my brother Dara on his shoulder and his companions walked from Preah Trapeang to Svay Daun Keo, the last village frontier Cambodia/Thailand.

Khmer Krom network introduced my father and his group to Khmer Krom in Battambang under Thai administration. There, he met Khmer-Thai families, Ta Chea, the father of the famous or infamous Nuon Chea and Mor Phuc (Phuc, MD) the father of Sarit Thanarat, the future Prime Minister of Thailand. Nuon Chea and Sarith Thanarat were cousin.

In 1941, it was the World War II. French government mobilized Vietnamese, Cambodians and Laotians to fight for France. France administration had imposed a quota for Vietnam. In Kampuchea Krom, Vietnamese leaders did not want Vietnamese to die for France because they prepared to fight France already. So they avoided the mobilization. Therefore, to fill the quota, Vietnamese officers of the French administration had forced Cambodian citizens to go to fight Germany in their place. Young Khmer Krom generation was decimated by war and some were taken prisoners of war in Germany.

Immediately after the World War II, General De Gaulle came to Kampuchea Krom and met Khmer Krom leaders, and Khmer Krom prisoners in Germany to thank them. De Gaulle told them that you should organize military, create a good army because if you didn't, you would lose your land of your ancestors in the near future. (Subject: One Nation, One Army.<sup>29</sup>

An example of this policy was its de facto alliance with the Vietnamese communist troops, which was undertaken without any reciprocal political commitment on its part.

The critical international situation and above all the refusal by the Americans to accept the emergence of a Third Force in Indochina caused the purely military solution to prevail in the end. This sort of outcome to the thirty-year-old conflict was to confer a permanent political pre-eminence upon the authoritarian tendencies of the various Indochinese communist parties. As early as 1976, different observers had remarked that the party in Vietnam was not able to impose all of its views on the army with respect to certain problems. The question of what to do with members of the former regime interned after the fall of Saigon pointed up the contradictions that existed between the military officials obsessed with the problems of security and the operatives of the party more concerned with political administration.

---

<sup>29</sup> Baphuon@aol.com (Baphuon) Newsgroups: soc.culture.cambodia Organization: <http://clubkhmer.com/>

The Vietnamese, in order to excuse somehow the enormous difficulties encountered by their administration, especially in the South, sought to explain them away by pointing to the lack of indigenous administrators, a situation created by the massacres perpetrated by such accelerated pacification programs as Phoenix and the like. This fact is undeniably true. But it is hardly pertinent. The overriding feature of the policy carried out since 1975 has been the all but total seizure of power to the sole advantage of the party. The vast majority of the population of the South, which had not actively participated in the struggle within the framework defined by the communists, has been excluded from the decision-making process. Its disillusionment is great. The stock of sympathy that the new communist regime possessed in April 1975 has been seriously diminished because of its own narrowness of view.

As Paul Mus had already remarked in the 1950s, in Vietnam it is not the men who win the war who are most apt to win the peace. In order to bring about the latter, the older generation formed during the Thirties and the Forties would have to hand over power to younger men who have risen through the ranks of both the party and the numerous groups that had secretly resisted the American hold on their country. But the party's encrusted Stalinist shell and its sluggish bureaucratic ways have not been called into question. Imagination, in other words, did not come to power. Even if great care has been taken in the establishment of new political and economic institutions, it remains no less true that the country's future course, as it has been traced by the party, has not varied one iota. The transformation of Vietnamese society over the past twenty years has been arrogantly ignored. A high price has been paid for this political rigidity: a weakened regime, economic impotence, and international isolation. Although Vietnam requests outside aid, it has done very little to help itself.

In this respect, the Cambodian model, put in place in 1975, is not unlike that of Vietnam, even though its structures are not altogether the same, mainly because of a very different historical context. Still, even in Cambodia the communist apparatus that seized the reins of power refused to make allowance for the social transformations bequeathed by the war. Instead of simply leaving in place the newly urbanized classes which, given the confused state of affairs at that time, could not be subjected to systematic control, the new regime decided to do away with them by dispersing them throughout the countryside. It is known that this operation, carried out against a population already weakened by the scarcity of food during the final months of the Lon Nol regime, caused a great number of victims, probably some tens or hundreds of thousands, though not the millions cited by naive or partisan propagandists. The most important fact about the Khmer Communist Party is certainly its heterogeneity. The party, which is, it should not be forgotten, quite small in size (several hundred members prior to 1970, several thousand since then), is composed of groups with different backgrounds: veterans of the first Indochina War who collaborated with the Viet Minh, some of whom remained in Cambodia while others left for North Vietnam, not to return until 1970; intellectuals educated in Paris within the framework of a French Communist Party then in the heyday of its great Stalinist period; young intellectuals

unemployable in Phnom Penh and attracted by the Chinese Cultural Revolution; peasants who had fled into the bush, victimized by the exactions of local officials; lastly, mention should be made of the young, uncultured peasants drafted into the armed forces of the resistance movement from 1970 onward, who were given extensive local responsibilities.

The hardships of the Sihanouk repression, the illiteracy of the peasant society and the slowness of communication came together to make of the communist movement a juxtaposition of poorly coordinated groups. In one area the active party members carried on electoral campaigns within the scarcely democratic framework of the Sihanouk regime. Elsewhere others had initiated guerrilla warfare and, although they were not able to win over the mass of the peasantry, succeeded in gaining the support of the more rebellious elements. Still other members of the party served as auxiliaries of the Viet Cong forces operating in the frontier regions. Each group defined itself in its own way. Questions of strategy with respect to the Phnom Penh regime or concerning relations with the Vietnamese, Chinese or Soviet communist parties received different responses. There was not even agreement on the origins of the movement itself; there are three distinct dates given in different documents for the founding of the Khmer Communist Party - 1951, 1960 and 1966.

The struggles among these different factions began to intensify in 1970 when the stakes became the leadership of the guerrilla war against the Americans and their local accomplices. Although little was known at the time about the existence of these rivalries, their consequences have not gone unnoticed.

In a manner certainly too schematic, it can be said that the Khmer Communist Party is composed of three major factions. The first, the most moderate in revolutionary terms, consists of those members who share the views of the Vietnamese party on how to defeat American imperialism and on the necessity for a broad-based political movement and for a gradual phasing in of socialism. Products for the most part of the teachings and the organizational traditions of the Indochinese Communist Party, they are naturally suspicious of nationalist or Maoist "deviations." On the other hand, they themselves are easy targets for attacks which label them as "lackeys of the Vietnamese," particularly those among them who lived for more than fifteen years in North Vietnam.<sup>30</sup>

WASHINGTON - Records of John Kerry's Vietnam War service released Wednesday show a highly praised naval officer with an Ivy League education who spoke fluent French and had raced sailboats -- the fruits of a privileged upbringing that set him apart from the typical seaman.

With conservative critics questioning his service in Vietnam, the Democratic candidate for president posted more than 120 pages of military records on his campaign Web site. Several describe him as a gutsy commander undertaking a dangerous assignment in Vietnam and detail some of the actions that won three Purple Hearts, a Bronze Star and a Silver Star.

---

<sup>30</sup> Endless betrayal Tactics From: Kh. Kung ([baphuon@aol.com](mailto:baphuon@aol.com)) b4vod3\$23u2tk\$1 @ID-150982.news.dfncis.de

Kerry's most harrowing experience came during the nearly five months when he commanded a swiftboat along Vietnam's Mekong Delta. The future Massachusetts senator was commended for gallantry, heroism and valor during the tour, which was cut short when Kerry was wounded three times and sent back to the United States. "He frequently exhibited a high sense of imagination and judgment in planning operations against the enemy in the Mekong Delta," wrote Lt. Cmdr. George Elliott, Kerry's commanding officer. "Involved in several enemy initiated fire fights, including an ambush during the Christmas truce, he effectively suppressed enemy fire and is unofficially credited with 20 enemy killed in actions." Talk radio conservatives and some veterans have questioned whether Kerry was wounded severely enough to leave combat, but Democratic National Committee Chairman Terry McAuliffe said he is eager to compare Kerry's record to President Bush's. McAuliffe accused Bush of using family connections to avoid service overseas and failing to show up for duty while in the National Guard. "Simply put, Kerry has a proud record of sacrifice and service whereas Bush has a record of cashed-in connections and evasion," McAuliffe said in a statement Wednesday. Republican National Committee spokeswoman Christine Iverson said, "Like so many of Terry McAuliffe's comments, this one is not worthy of the dignity of a response." Posted: Tue Apr 27, 2004 3:58 am Post subject: John Kerry vs. Vietcong (Viet communists) AP

Chann Sokhom, who I understand was the principal organiser of the "spontaneous demonstrations" of 1970, told me, with ill concealed contempt for my ignorance, as follows:

*"The Khmer Rouge and Sihanoukists do no exist. They were figments of the propaganda and imagination of Mr Sihanouk hiding in Peking.*

*"The only forces assigned against the Khmer Republic were the North Vietnamese and Vietcong. These forces occasionally had the odd Khmer among them and they also killed Khmers and left their bodies on the battlefields to trick the westerners and non republican fools."*<sup>31</sup>

### **Reporting Human Rights Violations**

Posted by [webmaster](#) - Saturday, February 21 2004 @ 17:56:43 PST

Human rights violation on the Khmer Krom people in South Vietnam has gone unnoticed by the international community for decades. Until recently through the tireless effort of the Khmers Kampuchea-Krom Federation (KKF), the Khmers Krom's suffering are starting to gain international attention.

The first human rights violation report on Khmer Krom was in 1998 by the United Nations (report [E/CN.4/1999/58/Add.2 "Civil and Political Rights, Including the Question of Religious Intolerance"](#)). The Viet Cong restricted the UN's special rapporteur's access to the Khmer Krom community during his visit, yet he found that the Viet Cong stole our land and temples, imprisoned our monks, force assimilation of Khmer Krom culture and religion.

---

<sup>31</sup> Colin Pratt: Killing the Khmer (2002) P.131

Khmer Krom now can alert the United Nations on the twenty-four hours Hot Line for Reporting Human Rights Violations. The Hot Line fax number in Geneva, Switzerland is 41-22-917-0092. This Hot Line is “especially valuable to those wishing to establish urgent, potentially life-saving contact with the Special Procedures Branch of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights”.

Information reported to this hot line enables the United Nations to address the five priorities areas of the United Nations human rights program including:

Human rights emergency situations;

Developing situations which may require preventive action by the High Commissioner;

Investigative missions by special rapporteurs or working groups;

Follow-up action by the High Commissioner to recommendations made by special rapporteurs and working groups;

Implementation efforts, including the work of treaty-based bodies and the provision of advisory services and technical assistance to United Nations Member States.

Let your voice be heard. The atrocities must stop!

United States, California December 10, 2003

Yvon Hanoi who are the secret murderous eliminators of Khmer race are the hereditary foes of Khmers not only at this present time but since 300 years ago. Yvon Tonkin’s likelihood is to walk invading the neighbors for plundering to raise their lives, to expand their land...<sup>32</sup>

Yvon Vietnam who were so panicky to find a trick, suddenly they knew that Geneva Conference deciding to end the war in Indochinese continent. Such a good opportunity has arrived, on 6-8-54, Yvon Hanoi ordered Bo Doi to come out of the jungles to line up smilingly and then raised their hands to say goodbye “Khmer brothers” going back to Vietnam. They shouted merrily, more meaningful smile than the Khmer landlords.

Since September, 1945, Bo Doi sneaked secretly into Cambodia. They walked with their bare feet silently. Contrary, on 6-8-54, Bo Doi had to pull back from Cambodia, suddenly Bo Doi lined up to get the trucks noisily to surprise the world and Khmer people...this is a wondrous trick to trick with eyes.

They had showed evidently in the eyes...Frenchmen pulled back from Cambodia. Bo Doi also pulled back from Cambodia...So Khmers who never considered, and then seriously

---

<sup>32</sup> Yiey Tien: Who was Angkar Leu/Cap Tren? P.12

misunderstood that: Bo Dois really volunteered to die for Khmers...because we-Khmers assumed only our catch sight of.<sup>33</sup>

In Cambodia Kandal, they had secret network consisting of 5,000 members of Khmer-Vietminh served them resolutely. When Bo Dois pulled troops out of Cambodia. They selected among 1000 men who were brought with them. As for other 4,000 who were dismantled hiding in the dark places to be network waiting for a good opportunity to come back. None of them came out to confess serving the Khmer Royal Government. Khmer Issarak, since the Cambodia had regained Independence, volunteered to confess uniting of serving the nation.

During 9 years, in which Bo Dois had bases in Cambodia. Yuon Hanoi-Vietminh tried hard to learn every angle, geography, jungle of Cambodia, to know the valuable stones. Especially they took an opportunity to have brought in lots of arms to hide in the jungles of Cambodia. For example, in Samlot village of Battambang province had 300 weapons. The two top leaders, who kept those weapons, were Moul Sambath, known as Ta Pet and Ros Nheum, known as Ta Kao.

They can compare to the implementation of Yuon plans in such a way and selections of live good mudfish in one basket, the dead rotten ones were the corrupt liberal Yuon, the bandits in the South were in another basket for easily implementing immediate second plans.

To avoid the International Law was said in the Treaty of Geneva Conference of July 1954 that Hanoi as Vietminh who had signed accepting with, promising that stops aggression of her neighbours. Therefore, in 1958, Hanoi invented as Vietcong instead, and then appointed Nguyen Ho Tho as the chairman. But must listen to and obey the same order of Ho Chi Minh. "Vietcong are in a panic finding a pretext!"<sup>34</sup>

In 1970, Bo Dois had 200,000 men in the bases all over the jungles of Cambodia. For the Khmer Armies were less 7 times than Vietcong were 20,000 men only.<sup>35</sup>

18 March, 1970 had passed, General Lon Nol met Son Ngoc Thanh, who always murmured: "So regretful, should not let this event taking place accidentally like this, which led him to have a bad name that he was the power seizer from Samdech Sihanouk." From the beginning, he was always honest and respected for Samdech from the bottom of his heart. He didn't think of betraying or seizing power from Preah Ang/Sihanouk at all.

So, in every addressing of his, he always reminded Khmer people that we had to be aware of Thmil-Super-Atheists! If when they took victory. They would change the faces of Cambodia

---

<sup>33</sup> Yiey Tien: Who was Angkar Leu/Cap Tren? P.26

<sup>34</sup> Yiey Tien: Who was Angkar Leu/Cap Tren? P.28

<sup>35</sup> Yiey Tien: Who was Angkar Leu/Cap Tren? P.33

according to their ideology. They would surely build a New Cambodia on the ash and bones of Cambodian people. “Was his advice right or not, now?”<sup>36</sup>

In 1970, the turmoil's took place in every town very strangely was the students of colleges and universities staged violent demonstration against Yuon ethnics. This strange event wasn't known of which the source came from. When there was this strange event happened like this, Yuon ethnics, who had enough abilities and means, had led their families back to Srok Yuon, there were numbers of 10,000 people at that time. A good chance had arrived, Vietcong selected thousands of Yuon adults, who learned and knew Khmer language very well, were sent into Political School. After finishing their studies of communist manoeuvre and ideology. They were promoted as 2Lts and were changed into Khmer names and then were sent back to Cambodia, assigning as the leaders of the Khmer Rouge yotheas who deeply loved Samdech Euv were to come to switch over the Bo Dois who could not speak Khmer.

The groups of these 2Lts who were so happy because returning to take revenge against Khmers who, before, had the mysterious demonstrators hitting their families when they were young.

From Washington, the US President Nixon, who didn't know much about the dirty motives of Yuon, had ordered the South Vietnam troops to clean up operation in the depth of 40Km of Cambodia from 30-4-1970 to 30-6-1970.<sup>37</sup>

At the same time, Hanoi sent Khmer-Vietminh who Yuon Hanoi as Vietminh selected being led to learn in Peking. In Hanoi since 1954, there were 3000 thousands to be repatriated to Cambodia, continuing war with the Khmer Republic was to wage war for Vietcong instead. As for Vietcong, they retreated to have rest looking on Khmers killing each other with their arms on the waists.

On the contrary, this Khmer group never had motive for Khmer, besides having deeply national consciousness instead. This group learned directly from Chinese, directly from Yuon Hanoi, knew, too, the plans of China-Yuon to annihilate Khmers for expanding Cambodia was to incorporate into the communist regime.

In 1973, the plans and stratagems that Vietcong implemented inside Cambodia, had improved much better than being expected. They had to reform, for example, the ideas of Ho Chi Minh who tried to select both Khmer Kandal and Khmer Krom youths who were sent to study in Peking, in Hanoi since 1948, and kept sending continuously for brainwashing, nurturing with their ideology and then invented into new Khmer of new Kampuchean landlord...etc.

---

<sup>36</sup> Yiey Tien: Who was Angkar Leu/Cap Tren? P.35

<sup>37</sup> Yiey Tien: Who was Angkar Leu/Cap Tren? Pp.46-47



In 1973, Yuon Hanoi received a good result for the situation of operation inside Cambodia. So they had to stop needing Cambodians in Ho Chi Minh's era. They changed to reform immediately was to kill these typical Khmers.<sup>38</sup>

Believing with Yuon Vietcong's incitement. For an example, Yiey Tien met an adult, named-Ra. On 23-01-91, at 1pm. Ra described to Yiey Tien the tricks of Vietcong:

In June 1970, saw Vietcong coming into a village of Prey Veng Province where Ra had lived since a child and forgot his real name. They walked arrogantly all over the place when they retreated. Suddenly, the plane dropped bombs, shelling to destroy the village. After the plane went off. Came the Vietcong again. And then they collected all Khmer people to put in one place where they already liberated. They prepared meal for the victims who ate plentifully but not long...Suddenly there was another Mysterious Group came to shoot and kill brutally only the old men. They kept only the youths and children. After this group went off, here came again the same Vietcong who collected the youths and children to educate strategy and then were sent into the Khmer Rouge yotheas. Then, child Ra was just 9 old years of age, who was conscripted by Vietcong to be an army with others, too. Vietcong sent the children into "KROM TREY KANCHOH" (THE NAME OF A SMALL FISH WITH TWO BARBS OR WHISKERS), consisting of 15 people in one group who were pushed to walk in the front line.

One day in 1972, 14 men in Ra's group had to be killed. Just only Ra survived. Ra was so panic to take risk escaping for his present survival. Ra continued to confirm that Vietcong instigated that the war caused from Lon Nol and the Americans seized power from Samdech Euv. Since Bo Dois retreated to hide themselves like this. Vietcong assigned a Special Committee, secretly sneaked to Cambodia to observe the situation of war...Therefore if any gentle Cambodian walked to meet them by chance. They ordered arrest of those unfortunate Khmers who were being accused of walking into the front line were brutally tortured and then were killed for erasing the evidence.<sup>39</sup>

Vietminh and Vietcong who tried very hard every means to kick the French colonialists, Japanese and American imperialists out of their country. The people in both Cambodia and Khmer Krom who would hope to have long-lasting peace and harmony and brilliant future for their children. But, contrary, our hope and future were horribly forced to be sunk into the bottom of the Atlantic Sea.

The results we Cambodians were the victims being caught in the middle, harassed, abused, and destroyed by the Northern Communists as well as the Southern authorities. Both sides wanted to reach the same goal; to destroy the Cambodians and acquire territory.

---

<sup>38</sup> Yiey Tien: Who was Angkar Leu/Cap Tren? Pp.50-51

<sup>39</sup> Yiey Tien: Who was Angkar Leu/Cap Tren? Pp.53-54



During the Vietnam War, the Khmer Krom and Khmer Kandal people became the experimental tools for modern weapons of the great nations. The Vietnamese, both South and North governments, used the Khmer Krom and Khmer Kandal lands as battlefields where big battles took place, where thousands and thousands of Khmer Krom people were either killed, relocated away from ancestral land or ended up in jail for being supporters of the South or the North. This was a well planned, logical method to exterminate the Khmer Krom people and grab the land. Both Vietminh and Vietcong killed any Khmers who got in their way was to fulfil long-daydream of their ancestors, as Nuon Khoeun clearly told to his Khmer children in his book, “Trip to the West, Indochina in 2000” in 1970 that Yuon would push their way into Cambodia.

For these reasons the Northern and Southern leaders attempted through ultra secret means to dominate the South Vietnam of the Khmer Krom people. However, they encountered considerable difficulty. In trying to cover up their barbarous acts from foreign opinion, they know very well that only communists dare to violate human rights since Prei Nokor/Saigon had fallen into the Barbarian Terror Regime of Hanoi Communist dictatorial leaders in 1975. In the end, all Khmer Krom people including Khmer Krom Buddhist monks, who were like the banana leaves being used by both the South and North Vietnam to wrap banana cakes, were brutally butchered. American imperialists, who were also being secretly used by South and North Vietnam, had nearly destroyed all Khmer Krom temples/wats and everything that belonged to Cambodians in both Khmer Krom and Khmer Kandal. Americans, Cambodians, Montangards and Laotians are really naively coned to serve their Yuon enemies.

All Yuon dictatorial leaders are not afraid of losing their own Yuon people lives as long as they can grab more lands from Khmer Victims to feed their hungry people because Yuon population keep growing so fast like earthquake that have killed so many people in South Asia with the walls of wave on exact Boxing Day, Sunday 26, 2004, which is the worst natural disaster in the world history. So when the war between the South and North started to break out, all Yuon citizens +Vietminh and Vietcong also started to sneak to live in Cambodia secretly without being seen. Because Cambodia was then-a-safe place for them to organize their struggle and secret plans against both Khmer Krom and Khmer Kandal. Who are the losers and the winners now? Short answers: All Khmer victims have become the real losers, whereas the Yuon Vietminh and Vietminh are the real winners of this game:

Their effects, primarily the spread of the Vietnam war into the Cambodian civil war encompassed social dislocation, economic ruin, loss of political sovereignty, and armed insurgency:

“By 1970 Cambodia's frontier with Vietnam was breaking down. It was unable to withstand the pressure exerted by the two mighty contending forces that had been expanding and straining against one another in the limited space of southern Vietnam since the escalation of 1965. The pressure was economic, demographic political, and military. Cambodia's rice crop drained into

devastated Vietnam, while both Khmers and Vietnamese fled into Cambodia, with the U.S. military and air force in pursuit.”<sup>40</sup>

In Vietnam casualties remained almost as high as ever over the next two years. During 1972, according to the pentagon, over 39,000 South Vietnamese soldiers had died in combat; in 1973, the figure would be almost 28,000, and in 1974 over 31,000. In Cambodia the war continued even more dreadfully than before.<sup>41</sup>

Recently, a Khmer Krom man and the Voice of Khmer Krom who clearly tells us Yuon Communist leaders are trying secretly to hunt down any Khmer Krom educated men. One man, Huynh Cuong who secretly worked for both Vietminh and Vietcong for more than 40 years, was appointed to be a leader of Khmer Krom in 21 provinces in South Vietnam. In the end, he was brutally injected dead in 2003/4 because Yuon communist leaders didn't want any Khmer Krom educated man to live on so they have to get rid of those who worked secretly for them. Because they are so afraid of those Khmer Krom people who used to work for them reporting to the UN in the New York City about their crimes against Khmer Krom people.

These are the sixth roots of the reasons that the Khmer people who really considered Yuon as their 3-Century-Old-Leech-Hereditary Foes who are the worst murderous violators of human rights on earth. And this was the Fourth Killing Fields that Yuon committed against Cambodians in the bitterest past. Yuon colonialists and imperialists are still trying to cover up their One Million Super-Dirty-Demonic Genocidal Plans against Khmer Krom before eyes of people in the outside world. Who created Killing Fields in 1975 to 1979 to brutally massacre more than 3 million innocent Cambodians, more 460,000 live again from 1979 to 1991 in Cambodia like that? Tragic irony of history; their victims, the peasants of Indochina, will be unforgotten. They will join the countless millions of earlier victims of Yuon tyrants, intimidators, murderers and oppressors. The misery and destruction for which all Yuon Dictatorial Communist leaders bear direct responsibility are crimes that can never be forgotten. Why were about three million Cambodian lives spent from 1975 to 1979 like that? Without about 3 million Khmer Kandal lives were spent; can all Khmer Krom refugees who are living overseas reveal their Endless Past and Present Unforgettable Painful Suffering Tragedies to the UN and world like that?

---

<sup>40</sup> <http://www.mekong.net/cambodia/media1.htm>

<sup>41</sup> William Shawcross: Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia (1986) P.259